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I.  INTRODUCTION 
After his wife became pregnant, Vannak Prum left their home in 
Cambodia and crossed over the border to Thailand, as thousands do each 
year, hoping to find work and return in a few months with enough money to 
pay the hospital bills.1  Prum spent the next three years on a Thai fishing boat 
working twenty-hour days against his will.2  He witnessed the beatings and 
murders of fellow slaves while harvesting mackerel and sardines that make 
up twenty percent of the American market for those fish.3  Similar means are 
used in the Thai shrimp industry, the largest in the world, which relies on 
slave labor in the farming and harvesting of shrimp that is sold at the four 
largest global retailers in the world: Walmart, Carrefour, Costco, and Tesco.4  
Shyima Hall, an Egyptian author and activist working to combat human 
trafficking, was sold when she was eight years old to another Egyptian 
family that moved to California and forced her to work for up to twenty 
hours a day for four years, suffering physical and verbal assaults.5  Domestic 
workers in the Middle East, India, and around the world are unexpectedly 
thrown into this thinly veiled cycle of slavery.6  In Paris, the “City of Light,” 
there are thousands of household slaves, lured from North Africa by 
promises of a French education in return for au pair services.7  In reality, the 
girls are domestic slaves, held under threat of violent beatings and sexual 
assault, in a state of malnutrition and poor health, to serve their 
“employers.”8 
                                                                                                                   
 1 Vannak Prum, Slavery at Sea, RADIO FREE ASIA (2011), http://www.rfa.org/english/ne 
ws/special/HumanTrafficking/vannak.html; Shannon Service & Becky Palmstrom, Confined 
To a Thai Fishing Boat, For Three Years, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 19, 2012, 3:06 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/2012/06/19/155045295/confined-to-a-thai-fishing-boat-for-three-years.  
 2 See Service & Palmstrom, supra note 1. 
 3 See id. 
 4 Kate Hodal, Chris Kelly & Felicity Lawrence, Revealed: Asian Slave Labour Producing 
Prawns For Supermarkets in US, UK, THE GUARDIAN, June 10, 2014, http://www.theguardi 
an.com/global-development/2014/jun/10/supermarket-prawns-thailand-produced-slave-labour.  
 5 DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 21 (2014), http://www.state.gov/docu 
ments/organization/226844.pdf. 
 6 Id. at 23, 28. 
 7 KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAVERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1–4 (3d ed. 
2012). 
 8 See id.  
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Brahima Male was twelve years old when he was offered work in Cote 
d’Ivoire.9  Once across the border from Mali, he was sold for less than thirty 
U.S. dollars to a cocoa farmer.10  The use of forced child labor in the cocoa 
industry of West Africa is well documented.11  Poor Malian children are 
promised money and jobs but are instead sold into slavery in Cote d’Ivoire 
and Ghana to work without pay under the constant threat of violence in order 
to harvest the cocoa that provides seventy percent of the world’s chocolate.12  
When the widespread use of child slaves on cocoa farms was uncovered by a 
Knight Ridder Newspapers investigation in 2001, the industry mounted a 
successful lobbying campaign to defeat proposed legislation that would 
require the industry to certify their products as “slave free.”13  Meanwhile, in 
America, children are sold the idea that uncommonly talented elves residing 
in an uncommonly outfitted Hollow Tree® are responsible for the production 
of chocolate and cookies.14  In an advertisement “sure to melt the hearts of 
audiences everywhere,” Nestle Toll House sounds the call to “bake the world 
a better place.”15 
Human trafficking and forced labor occur in many contexts around the 
world.  In the United States, temporary workers are exploited on farms for 
little or no pay yet are unable to leave without money or documents, and are 
                                                                                                                   
 9 Sudarsan Raghavan, Two Boys Tell of Descent Into Slavery, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, 
June 25, 2001, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20050215094139/http://www.jsonl 
ine.com:80/bym/news/jun01/slave26062501.asp.   
 10 Id.  
 11 See, e.g., Miki Mistrati & Roberto Romano, The Dark Side of Chocolate, TOP 
DOCUMENTARY FILMS (2010), http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/dark-side-chocolate/; Sudarsan 
Raghavan & Sumana Chatterjee, A Taste of Slavery, KNIGHT RIDDER NEWSPAPERS, June 24, 
2001, http://web.archive.org/web/20060917014323/http://vision.ucsd.edu/~kbranson/stopcho 
colateslavery/atasteofslavery.html.  
 12 Raghavan, supra note 9.  
 13 Sumana Chatterjee, Chocolate Firms Launch Fight Against ‘Slave Free’ Labels: 
Chocolate Firms Fight ‘Slave Free’ Effort, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 1, 2001, http://articles.phill 
y.com/2001-08-01/news/25298857_1_cocoa-farms-chocolate-industry-child-slaves.  
 14 See generally KEEBLER, http://www.keebler.com; The Museum of Classic Chicago 
Television, Keebler Cookies – “Oh, Fudge!,” YOUTUBE (1980), https://www.youtube.com/w 
atch?v=oUs2lxOxpMQ. 
 15 Sylvia G, JWT & Nestle “Bake The World a Better Place” in Newest Ad For Toll House 
Cookies, GREAT-ADS (Sept. 19, 2013), http://great-ads.blogspot.com/2013/09/jwt-nestle-bake-
world-better-place-in.html. 
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often unknowingly violating the terms of their temporary work permits.16  
Workers participating in the H-2 guest worker program have complained of a 
wide variety of threats and coercion, including wage theft, beatings, rape, 
starvation, and imprisonment.17  The number and variety of sex trafficking 
victims in America and around the world defy simple categorization.  More 
than four million women and children are victims of sex trafficking, 
including those from less-developed parts of the world like Southeast Asia 
and the former Soviet Union, but also hundreds of thousands of American 
youth.18  Sex trafficking is the third largest criminal enterprise in the world, 
behind drugs and arms dealing.19 
Estimates of the number of people suffering as victims of human 
trafficking vary widely, as the illegal nature of the practice keeps 
authoritative data hidden.20  In its 2012 report, the United Nations’ 
International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated 20.9 million people are 
victims of human trafficking around the world; a conservative estimate that 
stands in stark contrast to the ILO’s previous “minimum estimate” of 12.3 
million people in 2005.21  This means there are more slaves today than at any 
other time in human history.22  Alarmingly, there are more slaves living 
today than the total number of people taken from Africa as part of the 
transatlantic slave trade that lasted from the sixteenth to nineteenth century.23 
                                                                                                                   
 16 Claire Goforth, How U.S. Guest-Worker Program Helps Keep Human Trafficking Alive, 
ORLANDO WKLY., Sept. 9, 2014, http://orlandoweekly.com/news/how-u-s-guest-worker-progr 
am-helps-keep-human-trafficking-alive-1.1750167. 
 17 Jessica Garrison, Ken Bensinger & Jeremy Singer-Vine, The New American Slavery: 
Invited to the U.S., Foreign Workers Find a Nightmare, BUZZFEED, July 24, 2015, http:// 
www.buzzfeed.com/jessicagarrison/the-new-american-slavery-invited-to-the-us-foreign-work 
ers-f#.yxy9rb12b9. 
 18 See generally Amanda Walker-Rodriguez & Rodney Hill, Human Sex Trafficking, 
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN (Mar. 2011), https://leb. 
fbi.gov/2011/march/human-sex-trafficking (discussing the global problem as well as national 
statistics).   
 19 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, An Introduction to Human Trafficking: Vulnerability, 
Impact and Action (2008), https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/An_Introduc 
tion_to_Human_Trafficking_-_Background_Paper.pdf. 
 20 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, ILO GLOBAL ESTIMATE OF FORCED LABOR: RESULTS & 
METHODOLOGY 11 (2012), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm 
/@declaration/documents/publication/wcms_182004.pdf. 
 21 Id. at 11–13. 
 22 FREE THE SLAVES, https://www.freetheslaves.net/page.aspx?pid=301; BALES, supra note 
7, at 8–10. 
 23 BALES, supra note 7, at 9. 
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What all of these examples have in common is the potential to have their 
harms redressed through civil litigation in the United States.  When 
American citizens and American businesses benefit financially from 
trafficking and forced labor—here or around the worldthere exists a 
possibility for civil relief.  As one of the largest and most powerful 
economies in the world, it is unsurprising that much of the financial benefit 
from this global activity lands in the United States.  However, when it does, 
the possibility of redress should land with it as well.  
This Note will focus on the use of civil litigation in America to address 
human trafficking violations around the world.  Specifically, this Note will 
address how the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 
(TVPRA)24 provides the much needed tools to overcome some of the 
restraints apparent from recent decisions that limit the effectiveness of 
victims seeking accountability through the Alien Torts Statute (ATS).25  Part 
II will examine the beginnings of civil litigation under the ATS with the 
Filartiga decision,26 the first Supreme Court case utilizing the statute after 
nearly 200 years of inactivity.  Part II will then discuss modern litigation 
under the ATS as a means of combatting human rights violations, focusing 
on the ways in which the ATS has been used in the past and how its scope 
and utility has been narrowed through recent Supreme Court decisions.  Part 
III proposes the TVPRA, amended in significant ways in 2008, as a better 
path in combatting a broad array of human rights violations in light of the 
hurdles now apparent in litigation under the ATS.  Part IV will address 
impediments and challenges such an approach could face.  Part V will 
compare two recent ATS cases and determine whether the TVPRA would 
have been a more successful vehicle for those suits.  
II.  FILARTIGA, SOSA & KIOBEL: THE RISE & REDUCTION OF THE ATS  
Under the ATS, U.S. district courts have “original jurisdiction [over] any 
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of 
                                                                                                                   
 24 William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. 
L. No. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (2008) [hereinafter TVPRA] (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. 1590). 
 25 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  This Note uses the phrase “Alien Tort Statute” or ATS, to 
maintain consistency with Supreme Court usage.  See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 
2278, 2282 (2010); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 446, 472 (2004). 
 26 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
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nations or a treaty of the United States.”27  The statute has been used to bring 
litigation seeking to broaden the scope of accountability around the world for 
human rights abuses, but the few U.S. Supreme Court cases interpreting the 
ATS have limited its applicability in important ways.  This section will 
examine the beginnings of litigation under the ATS in modern times with an 
examination of the Filartiga decision.  Next, this section will discuss the 
limitations of the ATS as a tool for victims of human rights abuses in light of 
the U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Sosa and Kiobel.28  
A.  Filartiga and the Birth of Civil Litigation To Combat Human Rights 
Violations  
The modern American starting point for utilizing civil litigation as a tool 
to combat human rights violations is Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, a case in which 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Second Circuit) 
resurrected the ATS—a statute that had lain practically dormant for nearly 
two centuries.29  The ATS was enacted by the First Congress in 1789 to grant 
original jurisdiction to district courts over “any civil action by an alien for a 
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”30  This brief but sweeping jurisdictional act was designed to 
allow foreign nationals to sue either another foreign national or a U.S. 
citizen.  However, the ATS was only successfully invoked twice between the 
First Congress and the inauguration of Ronald Reagan.31  Interpreting the 
“law of nations” as synonymous to customary international law, the Filartiga 
Court resurrected the ATS as a possible vehicle for addressing human rights 
violations around the world.32  
In Filartiga, Dolly Filartiga brought suit against Americo Norberto Pena-
Irala for the wrongful death of her brother, Joelito Filartiga.33  Both citizens 
of Paraguay, Dolly charged Pena-Irala, the Inspector General of Police in 
                                                                                                                   
 27 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
 28 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 
133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 29 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 30 Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 587 (2002); 
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 31 See Bradley, supra note 30, at 588; Peter Jan Honigsberg, In Search of a Forum for the 
Families of the Guantanamo Disappeared, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 433, 456 (2012). 
 32 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–83.  
 33 Id. at 878. 
458 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.  [Vol. 44:451 
 
 
Asunción, Paraguay, with kidnapping and torturing Joelito to death in 
1976.34  In 1978, Dolly moved to Washington D.C. under a visitor’s visa and 
began seeking permanent political asylum in the United States.35  Shortly 
thereafter, she learned of Pena-Irala’s own relocation to Brooklyn, NY.36  
Dolly quickly contacted the Immigration and Naturalization Service and filed 
suit.37  Pena-Irala was ordered deported, an order that was stayed by the 
district court judge.38  However, the district court dismissed the action for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding the ATS did not provide federal 
jurisdiction, and Pena-Irala was returned to Paraguay.39 
The Filartiga Court found that an act of torture by state officials clearly 
violated the norms of international law and, in doing so, found, “it is clear 
that courts must interpret international law not as it was in 1789, but as it has 
evolved and exists among the nations of the world today.”40  The Second 
Circuit concluded that the ATS was consistent with Article III of the 
Constitution because “[t]he constitutional basis for the [ATS] is the law of 
nations, which has always been part of the federal common law.”41  The 
court succinctly swatted away objections that the ATS was an improper basis 
for jurisdiction, stating, “[t]his is undeniably an action by an alien, for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations.”42 
Thus, Filartiga opened the door for international human rights violations 
to be litigated in U.S. courts.  Since 1980, hundreds of suits have been 
brought in the United States alleging a variety of human rights violations 
around the world.43  
                                                                                                                   
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 878–79. 
 37 Id. at 879. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 880. 
 40 Id. at 881. 
 41 Id. at 885. 
 42 Id. at 887. 
 43 See, e.g., Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 
2009) (“cruel, degrading, and inhumane treatment,” denied on forum non conveniens 
grounds); Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994) (torture, 
execution, and disappearance); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) 
(torture, execution, and arbitrary detention); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845 (11th 
Cir. 1996) (torture); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995) (genocide). 
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B.  How the ATS Has Been Blunted by U.S. Courts  
The Supreme Court has chosen to limit the jurisdictional scope of the 
ATS on the two occasions it has reviewed the statute.44  In Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, the Court narrowed the interpretation of customary international 
norms, limiting the universe of potential causes of action available under the 
ATS.45  In Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., the Court restricted the 
jurisdictional reach of the statute, holding that the ATS was not 
presumptively extraterritorial.46  However, the Court left the door slightly 
open on the issue of how much and what type of conduct within the United 
States was necessary to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.47  In dicta, the Court noted additional potential restraints 
on the use of the ATS in both cases, including the possibility of an 
exhaustion of remedies requirement, susceptibility to a forum non conveniens 
challenge, and the still undecided question of whether the law of nations 
recognizes corporate liabilitythe question Kiobel was originally expected 
to answer.48  This section examines the Sosa and Kiobel decisions in turn, 
with an eye toward the sharply reduced scope of cases to which the ATS now 
applies. 
1.  Sosa: Norms of International Law 
In Sosa, the Court affirmed the basic nature of the ATS as “a 
jurisdictional statute creating no new causes of action.”49  This affirmation 
upheld the jurisdictional reach of the ATS to cases which are found to violate 
international norms, but at the same time greatly contracted its scope by 
                                                                                                                   
 44 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737–38 (2004); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch 
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013). 
 45 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 736–38. 
 46 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663–69. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21 (stating the Court would consider the exhaustion requirement 
in a more appropriate case); Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663 (granting certiorari to review the 
Second Circuit’s dismissal of an ATS claim on the basis that the law of nations does not 
recognize corporate liability despite ultimately deciding the case on extraterritorial grounds); 
Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 89 (D.D.C. 2014) (Exxon failed to prove its 
burden of an alternative forum sufficient for the court to consider a forum non conveniens 
challenge); Villeda Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (dismissal of ATS and TVPA claims on forum non conveniens grounds). 
 49 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724. 
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defining international norms as “a relatively modest set of actions” similar to 
the three universally agreed upon norms understood at the time of the 
statute’s enactment in 1789.50  The offenses cited by the Court as paradigms 
of eighteenth century offenses of common law were the violation of safe 
conducts, piracy, and the infringement of ambassador’s rights.51  The Court 
endorsed The Paquete Habana analysis of international law: 
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or 
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the 
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of 
these, to the works of jurists and commentators . . . not for the 
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to 
be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.52  
In Sosa, this limitation to international norms defeated the plaintiff’s claim that 
arbitrary arrest rose to the level of violating customary international law.53 
Later cases noted the call for restraint in applying modern international 
law, however, the analysis set forth in Sosa has been interpreted as 
“suggestive rather than precise.”54  Defining this standard has proven 
difficult.55  In attempting to enunciate a set of standards, the Court relied on a 
grab bag of earlier articulations that the limits of the ATS could be defined 
within “a handful of heinous actions—each of which violates definable, 
universal and obligatory norms”;56 “[a]ctionable violations of international 
                                                                                                                   
 50 Id. at 720. 
 51 Id. at 724–25, 732 (“[F]ederal courts should not recognize claims under federal common 
law for violations of any international law norm with less definite content and acceptance 
among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”).  
 52 Id. at 734. 
 53 Id. at 695. 
 54 Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting courts must 
exercise restraint in applying contemporary international law in an ATS case); Flomo v. 
Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., LLC, 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011) (“The Court’s effort at 
definition illustrates rather than solves the problems of notice and legitimacy and is best 
understood as the statement of a mood—and the mood is one of caution.”). 
 55 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1671 (2013) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (“Recognizing that Congress enacted the ATS to permit recovery of damages from 
pirates and others who violated basic international law norms as understood in 1789, Sosa 
essentially leads today’s judges to ask: Who are today’s pirates?”). 
 56 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33 (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 
(D.C. Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and obligatory”;57 “[a]nd the 
determination of whether a norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of 
action should (and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of judgment 
about the practical consequences of making that cause available to litigants 
in the federal courts.”58  Later cases have cited the “specific, universal, and 
obligatory” language as a workable definition and attempted to cite further 
authoritative sources of international law to determine whether the standard 
is met.59 
Although an arbitrary arrest—as in Sosa—is now clearly not considered a 
customary norm of international law, suits alleging more obvious violations 
of human rights have continued.60  Sosa limited the possible causes of action 
available to a plaintiff and called on courts to consider the potential flood of 
litigants to federal courts without such limitations.61  While this limitation 
shrinks the scope of potential future litigation, many human trafficking 
violations such as forced labor and sex trafficking remain within customary 
international norms.62   
2.  Kiobel: “Touch and Concern” 
In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court struck a near fatal blow to the use of the 
ATS to address human rights violations around the world.  In Kiobel, 
Nigerian nationals residing in the United States sued Dutch, British, and 
Nigerian corporations under the ATS for aiding and abetting the Nigerian 
government in violations of the law of nations.63  The unanimous decision in 
Kiobel answered the question of whether the ATS presumptively applied 
extraterritorially—it does not.64  However, by not reaching the merits, Kiobel 
                                                                                                                   
 57 Id. at 732. 
 58 Id. at 732–33 (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), and In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th 
Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59 Nestle, 766 F.3d at 1019 (citing In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 
25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 60 Id. at 1022; Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 90 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 61 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732–33. 
 62 Id. at 732. 
 63 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660 (2013). 
 64 Id. 
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failed to provide a clear rule from the Court as to whether the ATS may be 
applied to corporations as well as states.65  
This ruling essentially precludes all claims a victim of human trafficking 
or forced labor may have against a non-U.S. corporation.  The Kiobel ruling 
left open the possibility that a claim could “touch and concern” the United 
States with “sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application,” but noted that the amount of force necessary 
must be greater than “mere corporate presence.”66  Thus, alien suits against 
foreign corporations would most likely be impossible to maintain against 
corporations lacking substantial ties to the United States that implicate the 
specific claims in question. 
Commentators are divided on the impact of Kiobel on the future of ATS 
litigation.67  From a practical perspective, it is difficult to be optimistic about 
the scope of ATS litigation post-Kiobel, even if the issue of corporate 
liability remains undecided.  While it is true that there is still room for 
litigation of territorial violations of international law under the ATS, in the 
context of human trafficking in corporate supply chains and many forced 
labor claims, the most egregious and widespread violations of human 
trafficking norms occur beyond the territory of the United States.  Few 
corporations large enough to have major international activities routinely 
implement workplace conditions within the United States that violate 
international norms because of the great body of existing domestic 
legislation and case law aimed at protecting workers.68  What Kiobel 
                                                                                                                   
 65 Id. at 1663.  The Second Circuit initially dismissed the complaint in Kiobel on the 
reasoning that the law of nations does not recognize corporate liability, however, this issue 
was ultimately not reached as the Court decided the case on extraterritorial grounds. Id. 
 66 Id. at 1669.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Breyer noted that the corporations were 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange but “[t]heir only presence in the United States 
consists of an office in New York City (actually owned by a separate but affiliated company) 
that helps to explain their business to potential investors.”  Id. at 1677 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 67 See Matteo M. Winkler, What Remains of the Alien Tort Statute After Kiobel?, 39 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 171, 172–73 (2013) (finding “not much to fear” in a post-Kiobel 
landscape because it only eliminates suits against foreign defendants for foreign conduct and 
leaves the issue of corporate liability unsettled while noting former U.N. Secretary General’s 
Special Representative for Business and Human Rights John G. Ruggie’s prediction that 
“there would be little if anything left of the ATS” if the court found for the defendants, as it 
did). 
 68 See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678; Minimum Wage 
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.  But see Ruiz v. Fernandez, 949 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1076 (E.D. Wash. 
2013) (migrant workers in the United States); Ramos-Madrigal v. Mendiola Forestry Serv., 
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encourages is the further distancing of U.S. corporations between their 
activities abroad and their corporate headquarters in America by decreasing 
oversight and increasing the layers of subsidiary and supplier separation.  
This perversely incentivizes corporate willful blindness, which could be 
accomplished by the home office concerning itself only with dictating prices 
and allowing foreign suppliers to concern themselves with the means 
necessary to achieve the agreed-upon price point.69  
However, as noted above, the touch and concern test has left the door of 
opportunity partially open for litigants who are able to state a claim with 
sufficient plausibility that conduct in the United States substantially relates to 
their ATS claim.  Circuit courts are now grappling with the meaning of the 
touch and concern test, and four circuit courts have addressed the issue thus 
far.70 The Eleventh and Second Circuits are in agreement that corporate 
citizenship—a greater connection than mere presence—is not enough to 
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality under the ATS.71  The 
types of additional facts sufficient to overcome the presumption against 
extraterrioriality have only begun to be discussed at the circuit level.  
In Al Shimari, the Fourth Circuit found the presumption against 
extraterritoriality was displaced in a suit alleging acts of torture at the Abu 
Ghraib prison in Iraq.72  The court found substantial connections between the 
United States and the unlawful conduct because the torture was committed 
by U.S. citizens employed by a U.S. corporation, pursuant to a contract with 
                                                                                                                   
LLC, 799 F. Supp. 2d 958, 960 (W.D. Ark. 2011) (migrant workers); David v. Signal Int’l, 
LLC, No. CIV.A. 08-1220, 2014 WL 5489359, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2014) (temporary 
construction workers post-Katrina); Sulastri v. Halsey, No. CV 12-3538 (JS)(ARL), 2014 WL 
4904718, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2014), report and recommendation adopted by, No. 12-
CV-3538 (JS)(ARL), 2014 WL 4904527 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014) (worker recruited from 
Indonesia to work in couple’s basement shoe company).  
 69 Raghavan & Chatterjee, supra note 11; Hodal, Kelley & Lawrence, supra note 4.  This is 
essentially what plaintiffs and nationals in the affected countries are now arguing, that the 
only way to provide the products—fish meal or chocolate—at the dictated prices is to 
continue the practice of forced labor.  In the case of the Thai shrimping industry, as more Thai 
citizens enter the middle class, less are amenable to the conditions of the fishing boats and the 
boat captains are faced with a labor shortfall which they fill with slave labor to meet the 
quantity and price demands of the current market.  Hodal, Kelley & Lawrence, supra note 4. 
 70 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 94–95 (D.D.C. 2014); Al Shimari v. 
CACI Premier Tech., Inc., 758 F.3d 516, 520 (4th Cir. 2014); Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 
F.3d 174, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2013); Cardona v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 760 F.3d 1185, 1191 
(11th Cir. 2014); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 189 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 71 Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 189; Cardona, 760 F.3d at 1189. 
 72 Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 520. 
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the U.S. government at a U.S. military facility.73  The D.C. Circuit cited Al 
Shimari favorably, agreeing that U.S. corporate citizenship by itself was not 
enough, but “when plaintiffs allege U.S. based conduct itself constituting a 
violation of the ATS” then the presumption against extraterritoriality is 
overcome.74  Thus, the touch and concern test is met in the D.C. and Fourth 
Circuits when there is relevant conduct committed in the United States that 
indicates “knowledge and encouragement of international law violations 
abroad.”75  
In Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., the Second Circuit found the presumption 
against extraterritoriality overcome through the touch and concern test in a 
case that alleged the U.S. oil company and French bank maintained accounts 
and made payments routed through U.S. accounts that transmitted kickbacks 
to Saddam Hussein’s regime.76  Still, this is a much more difficult standard 
for plaintiffs to meet, even though courts have been accommodating in 
allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaints in light of the Kiobel ruling.77  
III.  HOW THE TRAFFICKING VICTIMS PROTECTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT 
(2008) OVERCOMES THE LIMITATIONS OF THE ATS  
The TVPRA, though open to criticism on a number of grounds, addresses 
many of the specific shortcomings exposed in recent litigation under the 
ATS.78  The 2008 amendments expressly gave the act extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.79  The amended act created a civil claim, in addition to the 
original criminal liability, against anyone who “knowingly benefits” from a 
venture which the defendant “knew or should have known” included acts 
which violate the TVPRA.80  The causes of action under the TVPRA are 
specifically defined, and include a wide array of potential activity that 
violates human rights around the world.81 
                                                                                                                   
 73 Id. at 528–29.  
 74 Exxon, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 95. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 189–90 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 77 Exxon, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 96. 
 78 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589–1596. 
 79 Id. § 1596. 
 80 Id. § 1595. 
 81 Id. § 1589. 
2016] A TRUCK STOP INSTEAD OF SAINT PETER’S  465 
 
 
A.  Express Extraterritoriality 
As an initial matter, the TVPRA explicitly became extraterritorial in 
jurisdiction through the 2008 amendments.  The only remaining limitation on 
jurisdiction is that an alleged offender must be either a U.S. national, a 
permanent resident alien, or at least present in the United States.82  This 
amendment has been interpreted as a congressional response to decisions 
such as Roe v. Bridgestone, where the trial court dismissed civil lawsuits 
alleging violations in Liberia, stating that absent a clear congressional intent, 
legislation “is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.”83 
At least one U.S. District Court has found a limitation on the 
extraterritorial jurisdiction of the TVPRA.84  Finding the creation of 
jurisdiction a substantive rather than procedural rule (in contrast to a transfer 
of existing jurisdiction) the U.S District Court for the Southern District of 
Texas held the presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction applied to the 
TVPRA.85  Thus, the amendment granting extraterritorial jurisdiction was 
not given retroactive effect.86  Should this interpretation of § 1596 stand, the 
practical effect would be to limit the reach of the statute’s jurisdiction to 
extraterritorial action occurring after 2008.  
B.  Limitations of Sosa to Claims that Violate International Norms 
The causes of action under the TVPRA are limited to claims defined as 
sex trafficking and forced labor.87  However, these definitions are 
intentionally broad and include many types of mistreatment and coercion that 
go beyond the limited causes of action under the ATS.88  In the criminal 
                                                                                                                   
 82 18 U.S.C. § 1596(a) (2008). 
 83 Kathleen Kim, The Trafficked Worker As Private Attorney General: A Model for 
Enforcing the Civil Rights of Undocumented Workers, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 247, 298–99 (2009); 
John Roe v. Bridgestone Corp., 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2007). 
 84 Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 994 F. Supp. 2d 831 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
 85 Id. at 839. 
 86 Id. at 840.  See also Cruz v. Maypa, 981 F. Supp. 2d 485, 488 (E.D. Va. 2013) (finding 
the TVPRA’s ten-year statute of limitations, added in 2008, also does not apply retroactively). 
But see Camayo v. John Peroulis & Sons Sheep, Inc., No. 10-CV-00772-MSK-MJW, 2013 
WL 3927677, at *2 (D. Colo. July 30, 2013) (applying the ten-year statute of limitations 
retroactively as a new procedural rule). 
 87 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1591 (2008). 
 88 Id. § 1589. 
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context, defendants have consistently urged courts to construe the elements 
of the TVPRA narrowly; however, courts have instead consistently opted for 
broader interpretations of the statute.89  A look at the interlocking definitions 
of some of the TVPRA’s key terms shows that the actions Congress intended 
to capture with the TVPRA are potentially broader than critics of the act 
have previously indicated. For example, “severe forms of trafficking in 
persons” is defined by the TVPRA as: 
(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is 
induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the 
person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 
years of age; or 
(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, 
or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the 
use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of 
subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt 
bondage or slavery.90  
The TVPRA of 2008 further defined forced labor as occurring: 
(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical 
restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that 
person or another person; 
(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious 
harm to that person or another person; 
(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of 
law or legal process; or 
(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern 
intended to cause the person to believe that, if that 
person did not perform such labor or services, that 
                                                                                                                   
 89 Mohamed Y. Mattar, Interpreting Judicial Interpretations of the Criminal Statutes of the 
Trafficking Victims Protection Act: Ten Years Later, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
1247, 1267–68 (2011); United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011) (noting the 
“increasingly subtle” means used by modern traffickers and the broad definition of “harm”). 
 90 22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2013). 
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person or another person would suffer serious 
harm or physical restraint.91  
Finally, the legislature defined “serious harm” as  
[A]ny harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including 
psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is 
sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to 
compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the 
same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor 
or services in order to avoid incurring that harm.92  
Due to the expanded scope of liability in the TVPRA to anyone who 
knowingly benefits from the above violations, the universe of potential 
defendants was increased beyond primary tortfeasors and even beyond those 
aiding and abetting a violation of these sections.  Courts have found that 
threats of deportation, withholding of documents, intentional manipulation, 
and indebtedness to an employer that makes escape unreasonably difficult, 
are all allegations that may constitute “serious harm” under the statute.93 
The addition of the “serious harm” definition in 2008 is significant to the 
TVPRA’s potential causes of action.  The definition inserts a subjective 
element in the ostensibly objective standard—finding serious harm to be any 
physical or nonphysical harm “sufficiently serious . . . to compel a 
reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to 
perform or to continue performing labor” to avoid the harm.94  This is a 
much wider net than the “force, fraud, or coercion” limitations of the original 
act and considers “all the surrounding circumstances” from the perspective 
of a similarly situated victim.95  In the criminal context, serious harm was 
found to include an employer’s threat to a live-in housekeeper of owing the 
employer $8,000 should the housekeeper leave her job.96  The inclusion of 
                                                                                                                   
 91 18 U.S.C. § 1589 (2008). 
 92 Id.  
 93 Franco v. Diaz, 51 F. Supp. 3d 235, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (deportation); Ruiz v. 
Fernandez, 949 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1076–77 (E.D. Wash. 2013) (documents); Nuñag-Tanedo v. 
E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (intentional 
manipulation and indebtedness). 
 94 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2) (2008). 
 95 United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1169 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 96 Id. at 1162. 
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psychological harm in the definition of serious harm could incorporate a 
number of instances in which threats were used to induce a person to conduct 
“labor or services” (the meaning of which is discussed below), and should be 
capable of capturing causes of action that go far beyond international norms 
to include unfair, manipulative, or abusive work practices around the 
world.97  
C.  The Plain Meaning of the TVPRA Includes Corporations  
Kiobel left undecided whether the ATS applies to corporations.98  There 
is, however, no such ambiguity in the TVPRA.  The 2008 amendments 
broadened the scope of the TVPRA to include a cause of action against 
“[w]hoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value 
from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have 
known has engaged in” forced labor or sex trafficking as defined in the act.99  
For purposes of § 1591, the TVPRA further defines “venture” as “any group 
of two or more individuals associated in fact, whether or not a legal 
entity.”100  While § 1591 is limited specifically to “sex trafficking of children 
or by force, fraud, or coercion,” it would be unexceptional to infer that courts 
would use this definitionas some courts have101throughout the statute 
when applying the “usual presumption that the same words repeated in 
different parts of the same statute have the same meaning.”102  Whether those 
organizations are of an informal nature or of a legal nature as in the case of 
corporations,103 the ordinary meaning of the language specifically includes 
individuals and groups.  
In recent years, district court cases from around the country have 
routinely allowed claims to be alleged against companies and corporations of 
various types since the amendments were enacted.  In Panwar v. Access 
Therapies, Inc., a foreign national was found to have properly stated a claim 
                                                                                                                   
 97 Kiwanuka v. Bakilana, 844 F. Supp. 2d 107, 114 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding yelling and 
threats of deportation sufficient psychological harms). 
 98 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum  Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663. 
 99 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2008). 
 100 Id. § 1591(e)(5).  
 101 La. Mun. Police Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Hershey Co., No. CA 7996-ML, 2013 WL 6120439, 
at *5 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 2013). 
 102 Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 584 (2007); Atl. Cleaners & Dyers v. 
United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932). 
 103 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(5) (2008). 
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under the TVPRA for violations by an Indiana corporation for failure to pay, 
coercion, and threats of financial harm.104  In Nuñag-Tanedo v. East Baton 
Rouge Parish School Board, Filipino nationals alleged a claim against a 
teacher-recruitment firm that threatened financial consequences and 
deportation.105  The defendants in Sulastri v. Halsey included a married 
couple and their corporation, which used an Indonesian staffing company to 
find labor for the corporation.106  Similarly, the plaintiffs in David v. Signal 
International, LLC successfully alleged under the TVPRA threats of serious 
financial harm by the defendant limited liability corporation.107  Thus far, in 
recent cases, many of which have only reached preliminary rulings on 
summary judgment motions, none of the defendant corporations have 
asserted that the TVPRA does not apply to corporations.  The plain language 
of the statute supports this interpretation.  
IV.  POTENTIAL IMPEDIMENTS WITHIN THE TVPRA 
The most significant shortcoming of the TVPRA in addressing broad 
human rights violations in the place of the ATS is the likely exclusion of 
much noneconomic activity previously thought actionable under the ATS.  
Implicit support for military and paramilitary activity or acts of otherwise 
indiscriminate killing likely would not satisfy the purposeful coercion aspect 
of the TVPRA discussed below.  However, even within the wide scope of 
human trafficking captured by the statute, the TVPRA has been criticized for 
not going as far as other international measures.108  
                                                                                                                   
 104 Panwar v. Access Therapies, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 2d 948, 957–58 (S.D. Ind. 2013), 
reconsideration denied, No. 1:12-CV-00619-TWP-TAB, 2014 WL 2882914 (S.D. Ind. June 
25, 2014). 
 105 Nuñag-Tanedo v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 790 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1138–39 (C.D. 
Cal. 2011). 
 106 Sulastri v. Halsey, No. CV 12-3538 (JS)(ARL), 2014 WL 4904718, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 
21, 2014), report and recommendation adopted by, No. 12-CV-3538 (JS)(ARL), 2014 WL 
4904527 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2014). 
 107 David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, No. CIV. A. 08-1220, 2014 WL 5489359, at *5 (E.D. La. 
Aug. 13, 2014). 
 108 Mattar, supra note 89, at 1294–96. 
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A.  “Severe” Forms of Human Trafficking and the Palermo Protocol 
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act was originally passed in 2000 as 
similar statutory measures were being passed around the world.109  The 
statute has been viewed as an implementation of the U.N. Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children (Palermo Protocol), which required the adoption of specific 
anti-trafficking statutes by States.110  Though U.S. courts have interpreted the 
TVPRA’s prohibition on forced labor more broadly than defendants have 
urged, the Act’s statutory definition of “severe forms of human trafficking” 
has been criticized as being narrower than the Palermo Protocol.111  The 
TVPRA’s requirement of proving force, fraud, or coercion is not necessary 
under the Palermo Protocol, which further defines trafficking to include “the 
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability” and states that consent 
expressed by a person in such a vulnerable condition is irrelevant.112  
Conversely, the TVPRA has been criticized as leaving in place the idea that a 
trafficked person would remain able to consent up to the point of severe 
force or coercion.113  Thus, while the TVPRA was a landmark in creating a 
comprehensive statutory regime for prosecuting human trafficking 
violations, the Act could have further expanded the statute’s reach beyond 
“severe” forms of human trafficking.  However, in light of the broad 
interpretation of the Act’s “coercion” and “serious harm” definitions added 
in 2008, as well as the inclusion in the amendments of “threats of force” as a 
severe form of trafficking, the functionality of the TVPRA is such that a 
                                                                                                                   
 109 See Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
114 Stat. 1464 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 22, 27 & 42 U.S.C.); Mattar, 
supra note 89, at 1294. 
 110 Mattar, supra note 89, at 1294. 
 111 Id. at 1295; 22 U.S.C. § 7102.  
 112 United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, supplementing, the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/25, Annex II (Dec. 25, 
2003), art. 3(a), 3(b); Karin Dryhurst, Liability Up the Supply Chain: Corporate Accountability 
for Labor Trafficking, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 645–46 (2013).  
 113 Jane Kim, Note, Trafficked: Domestic Violence, Exploitation in Marriage, and the 
Foreign-Bride Industry, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 443, 492 (2011). 
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large portion of the targeted behaviors and violations are captured in its 
statutory net.114   
B.  The “Knowing” Standard  
In an age of complex global supply chains, one of the most practical 
difficulties of alleging a violation of the TVPRA is proving the knowledge 
standard.  The TVPRA allows for civil liability against “whoever knowingly 
benefits” from a venture which has engaged in forced labor if those parties 
were in “knowing or reckless disregard of the fact that the venture has 
engaged in the providing or obtaining of labor or services” in violation of the 
TVPRA.115  Again, in terms of the modern global supply chain, it is unlikely 
that major corporate interests would have knowingly and directly engaged in 
human trafficking.116  However, it remains unknown precisely how much 
involvement with a company’s suppliers would be necessary to prove a 
reckless disregard standard.117  Since the civil cause of action under the 
TVPRA was established, there have been a distressingly low number of 
cases brought under the statute; and thus, a lack of case law that has reached 
the merits from which to draw conclusions.118   
Some criteria have been set forth by commentators for determining 
whether a corporation knew or should have known about trafficking 
violations by suppliers.  These include: the terms of the labor contractor 
agreement, the reasons behind a company externalizing part of its labor force 
in the first place, and whether the company had any reasonable notice of 
possible labor trafficking violations.119  While allowing for greater 
                                                                                                                   
 114 Theodore R. Sangalis, Comment, Elusive Empowerment: Compensating the Sex 
Trafficked Person Under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 403, 
423 (2011). 
 115 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b), (d) (2008). 
 116 See generally Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014) (“This is 
not to say that the purpose standard is satisfied merely because the defendants intended to 
profit by doing business in the Ivory Coast. Doing business with child slave owners, however 
morally reprehensible that may be, does not by itself demonstrate a purpose to support child 
slavery.”); Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 69 F. Supp. 3d 75, 97 (D.D.C. 2014) (allowing 
plaintiffs an opportunity to amend pleadings in light of Kiobel to state a clearer claim of 
liability as to Exxon). 
 117 Dryhurst, supra note 112, at 661–62. 
 118 Id. at 672–73; Jennifer S. Nam, Note, The Case of the Missing Case: Examining the Civil 
Right of Action for Human Trafficking Victims, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2007). 
 119 Dryhurst, supra note 112, at 662. 
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accountability, there is debate as to whether such knowing standards will 
actually encourage more responsive human trafficking prevention measures 
or whether such liability rules will lead to less monitoring activity under the 
theory that the less a company monitors its supply chain, the less the 
company could be shown to know, decreasing the company’s potential 
liability.120  
Similar to the ATS pleading issues discussed above, plaintiffs face 
significant challenges in pleading factual allegations with sufficient 
specificity to state a claim against a corporation alleged to have only 
constructive knowledge of a violation under the TVPRA.  Courts have found 
non-specific allegations attributing knowledge to companies who used 
recruiting companies to hire plaintiffs insufficient to state a claim.121 
C.  The Limitations of “Coercion” 
As discussed above, the TVPRA does not extend as far as the Palermo 
Protocol in the activity it is defined as capturing.  Another example of the 
limitations of the TVPRA is in its definition of “coercion” as required to 
constitute an actionable claim.  It is unclear, and probably unlikely, that the 
TVPRA captures much noneconomic political or military activity.  The 
TVPRA defines “coercion” as:  
(A) threats of serious harm or physical restraint against any 
person; (B) any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a 
person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in 
serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; or (C) 
the abuse or threatened abuse of the legal process.122  
Under the TVPRA, “severe forms of trafficking in persons” includes 
coercion as an actionable element of the “recruitment, harboring, 
                                                                                                                   
 120 Id. at 663. 
 121 Kelsey v. Goldstar Estate Buyers Corp., No. 3:13-CV-00354-HU, 2014 WL 1155253, at 
*6 (D. Or. Mar. 21, 2014) (“Whether it is ultimately sufficient to state a claim, it will only be 
so if sufficient factual allegations are made of the actual exercise of force, the threats made of 
the potential use of force, the physical restraints used or threatened, and what serious harm 
actually befell Plaintiffs or was threatened in sufficient detail to demonstrate a violation of the 
statutes relied upon.”). 
 122 22 U.S.C. § 7102 (2013). 
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transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services.”123  
Thus, if a corporation or organization engages in coercion in the pursuit of 
obtaining “labor or services,” then a claim could be applicable against the 
defendants under the TVPRA.  
The interpretation of “labor or services” has received some analysis in 
criminal cases brought under the TVPRA.124  The U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of New York interpreted “labor or services” broadly, relying 
on the ordinary meaning of the words; an approach upheld by the Second 
Circuit.125  “The ordinary meaning of the term labor is an ‘expenditure of 
physical or mental effort especially when fatiguing, difficult, or compulsory.  
The term ‘services,’ is defined as ‘useful labor that does not produce a 
tangible commodity.’ ”126 Under this definition, “labor or services” 
ordinarily means a useful expenditure of physical or mental effort that does 
not produce a commodity.  This definition could potentially encompass 
noneconomic activity such as torture or the arbitrary arrest in Sosa if the 
activity was done for the purpose of producing a desired outcome. For 
example, obtaining a confession, affecting political behavior, or otherwise 
changing a person’s anticipated affirmative behavior to an alternate course 
that is beneficial to the offending party could arguably suffice.   
Using this admittedly broad understanding of labor and services brought 
about by coercion could capture some portion of noneconomic activity no 
longer actionable under the ATS.  However, this ordinary understanding of 
labor and services does not easily apply to political or other behavior that 
essentially amounts to inaction.  Political acts such as imprisonment to 
silence dissent or to punish prior transgressions do not easily fit under the 
ordinary meaning of “services.”127 
                                                                                                                   
 123 Id. 
 124 Mattar, supra note 89, at 1267. 
 125 United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 289, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), vacated, 538 F.3d 
97 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 560 U.S. 258 (2010), and aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 
628 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 126 Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d at 300. 
 127 There is an argument that obtaining a person or group’s silence and agreement to refrain 
from dissent is certainly a beneficial service, especially if the behavior was ongoing prior to 
the torture and stopped or encouraged to be stopped by the torture.  Proving the absence of a 
behavior as a service would be an uphill climb for any plaintiff without clear evidence of the 
prior behavior the torturer wished to eliminate or alter.  
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D.  Constitutional Challenges 
The TVPRA has been challenged on a number of constitutional claims 
alleging overreach of the Commerce Clause, void for vagueness, and Ex Post 
Facto grounds.128  As discussed above, courts have generally concluded that 
the words of the statute are to be given their ordinary or defined meanings, 
defeating most claims of vagueness within the sections of the TVPRA.129  
Similarly, claims of congressional overreach under the Commerce Clause 
have failed.130  Many cases of forced labor and sex trafficking involve an 
international element of moving non-citizens across borders, clearly within 
the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause’s enumerated grant of authority.  
The Eleventh Circuit found the TVPRA to be part of a “comprehensive 
regulatory scheme” and that activity such as sex trafficking and forced labor 
has an “aggregate economic impact on interstate and foreign commerce” 
justified under rational basis review.131 
However, the TVPRA has been found to violate the Ex Post Facto Clause 
of the Constitution.132  Courts have consistently held that conduct from 
before the enactment of the TVPRA cannot be the basis of a later claim, 
though ongoing conduct begun before the statute’s enactment and continued 
thereafter does subject defendants to potential liability under the act.133  
Thus, even though the TVPRA has a ten-year statute of limitations,134 the 
alleged relevant conduct must have occurred after both the statute was 
enacted and after 2008 to take advantage of the plaintiff-friendly 
amendments such as extraterritorial jurisdiction, and the addition of those 
who knowingly benefit from forced labor as possible defendants.  
                                                                                                                   
 128 Mattar, supra note 89, at 1275. 
 129 Id. at 1281–82.  
 130 Id. at 1277. 
 131 United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 132 United States v. Marcus, 538 F.3d 97, 98 (2d Cir. 2008), rev’d, 560 U.S. 258 (2010); 
Mattar, supra note 89, at 1275. 
 133 United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 264 (2010) (“[I]f the jury, which was not 
instructed about the TVPA’s enactment date, erroneously convicted Marcus based exclusively 
on noncriminal, preenactment conduct, Marcus would have a valid due process claim.”); 
Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 994 F. Supp. 2d 831, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (finding the 
addition of extraterritorial jurisdiction to the TVPRA in 2008 was substantive and not 
procedural and, thus, cannot be applied retroactively); United States v. Jackson, 480 F.3d 
1014, 1024 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A]bhorrent conduct does not give us license to ignore the 
elements of the criminal statutes that Congress has established.”). 
 134 18 U.S.C. § 1595 (2008). 
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E.  Diplomatic Immunity 
The TVPRA does not allow for a cause of action against the conduct of 
foreign diplomats in the United States, the most common infraction being 
that of domestic servitude.135  The U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia noted, “the TVP[R]A does not override diplomatic immunity. 
First, the TVP[R]A is silent as to whether it limits the immunity of 
diplomats, and courts should not read a statute to modify the United States’ 
treaty obligations in the absence of a clear statement from Congress.”136   
Long-standing interpretive doctrine supports the idea that legislation 
should not be interpreted to “violate the law of nations or an international 
agreement to which the United States is a party.”137  Though the TVPRA 
does not overcome diplomatic immunity as a remedial matter, the 2008 
amendments created the ability of the Secretary of State to suspend the 
issuance of A-3 or G-5 visas to those seeking diplomatic work, “if the 
Secretary determines that there is credible evidence that 1 or more employees 
of such mission or international organization have abused or exploited 1 or 
more nonimmigrants holding an A-3 visa or a G-5 visa, and that the 
diplomatic mission or international organization tolerated such actions.”138   
Additionally, at least one district court has ruled that former diplomats 
enjoy residual immunity only for “official acts” and found claims of 
trafficking and forced labor to be private, not official acts, and thus subject to 
the court’s jurisdiction.139  While not addressing the issue of human rights 
violations by diplomats as strongly as it could, the TVPRA does provide the 
potential to seek out and address trafficking issues on the front end should 
such potential violations become apparent. 
V.  CASE STUDIES: ATS V. TVPRA 
The biggest barrier to amending pleadings alleging a violation of the ATS 
to include a TVPRA claim is the possibility that the 2008 amendments do not 
                                                                                                                   
 135 Mattar, supra note 89, at 1287–88. 
 136 Sabbithi v. Al Saleh, 605 F. Supp. 2d 122, 130 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 137 Elizabeth Grant, Comment, Ignoring the Technicality’s Temptation: Interpreting the 
Citizenship of A Foreign Official Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. 
REV. 389, 406 (2013) (describing the “Charming Betsy” canon). 
 138 8 U.S.C. § 1375c (2008). 
 139 Baoanan v. Baja, 627 F. Supp. 2d 155, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
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apply retroactively.  For that reason, though the facts of some cases seem 
better suited to the TVPRA, the statute would not automatically reach action 
prior to 2008.140  However, a look into the reasons why some cases were 
dismissed under the ATS and an inquiry into how the TVPRA would have 
been applied under similar circumstances is still instructive for future 
actions.  
This section will explore two types of representative cases brought under 
the ATS, one economic and one non-economic.  Though arguably any action 
taken by a corporation is taken for an economic purpose, it is necessary to 
separate the activities of labor, including sex trafficking, from activities of a 
political nature that companies may take for security purposes.  As discussed, 
actions beyond sex trafficking captured by the TVPRA likely must be those 
taken in the form of traditional labor and services.  Such traditional labor and 
services are referred to here as economic activity.  Non-economic activity, as 
used here, is activity of a political or military nature, such as killing or 
torture.  This non-economic activity is likely not captured within the 
TVPRA.  This section will compare two cases dismissed under the ATS in 
order to examine how the TVPRA could potentially deal with cases of an 
economic and non-economic nature.  
A.  Economic Activity: Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc. 
There have been few successful claims against corporations in utilizing 
the aiding and abetting theory of liability under the ATS.141  Prior to Kiobel, 
these claims could be brought against corporations for human rights 
violations in their international supply chain, even if the claims were rarely 
successful.142  The theory, however, presented a difficult standard to meet.  
Plaintiffs were required to prove the corporation’s purposeful intent “to 
engage in conduct that it knew would facilitate or cause serious human rights 
violations.”143  To overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality in an 
                                                                                                                   
 140 It is important to note that only one district court has thus far found the TVPRA’s grant 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction to be non-retroactive.  See Adhikari v. Daoud & Partners, 994 F. 
Supp. 2d 831, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2014) (finding the addition of extraterritorial jurisdiction to the 
TVPRA in 2008 was substantive and not procedural and thus cannot be applied retroactively).   
 141 Naomi Jiyoung Bang, Justice for Victims of Human Trafficking and Forced Labor: Why 
Current Theories of Corporate Liability Do Not Work, 43 U. MEM. L. REV. 1047, 1055–65 
(2013). 
 142 Id. at 1056. 
 143 Id. at 1057. 
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aiding and abetting claim under the ATS, courts require this showing of 
purposeful human rights abuses by corporations, as opposed to only 
knowledge of the activity.144  In one case, the court stated that the defendants 
were alleged to have “acted purposefully in violating [an international 
agreement], but merely knowingly in aiding and abetting the underlying 
violations of the law of nations.”145 
In Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., three former child slaves of the cocoa 
industry in Cote d’Ivoire argued an aiding and abetting child slavery theory 
under the ATS against Nestle USA (Nestle), Cargill Incorporated Company, 
and Cargill Cocoa.146  In addition to the well-known human rights violations 
related to the cocoa trade in West Africa, the plaintiffs alleged the three 
corporate defendants had first-hand knowledge of child slavery in Cote 
d’Ivoire gained through “numerous visits” to the farms.147  The district court 
dismissed the complaint, finding “that corporations cannot be sued under the 
ATS, and that even if they could, the plaintiffs failed to allege the elements 
of a claim for aiding and abetting slave labor.”148  “Although the defendants 
do not own cocoa farms themselves, they maintain and protect a steady 
supply of cocoa by forming exclusive buyer/seller relationships with Ivorian 
farms” and import most of this cocoa into the United States.149  Through 
financial and technical support, including training on appropriate labor 
practices, “the defendants effectively control the production of Ivorian 
cocoa.”150  Additionally, the court noted the defendants’ active lobbying 
efforts to oppose a 2001 bill that would have required such U.S. importers 
and manufacturers to certify their products as “slave free.”151  An industry-
supported “voluntary enforcement system” was adopted instead.152 
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs in Doe I were granted leave to amend their 
complaint to attempt to state the elements of an aiding and abetting claim 
under the ATS in light of the Kiobel ruling.153  
                                                                                                                   
 144 Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 145 Id. at 193 (emphasis in original). 
 146 766 F.3d 1013, 1017–18 (9th Cir. 2014). 
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As discussed above, such an aiding and abetting theory requires the 
showing of purposeful intent to commit human rights violations.  By 
contrast, the TVPRA requires only a reckless disregard of the fact that forced 
labor was used in a venture in which the defendant benefitted financially.154  
This standard would seem to be met in Doe I according to the facts relied 
upon by the court.  The companies provided training and financial support on 
site and actively lobbied against measures designed to curtail such slave 
labor.  This indicates that the defendants at least should have known of the 
conditions in which the plaintiffs worked.  The labor at issue also seems to 
easily meet the definition of forced labor and coercion under the TVPRA.155  
The heightened standard required in an aiding and abetting claim under 
the ATS is necessary to overcome the presumption against extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.  As previously discussed, the TVPRA has been amended to 
provide extraterritorial jurisdiction explicitly; thus no heightened standard is 
required.  The TVPRA is perhaps most useful in these types of cases which 
involve economic activity where victims are actually engaged in labor that 
financially benefits the company.  A much more difficult case arises when 
the company benefits financially not from a person’s labor, but from their 
death.  
B.  Noneconomic Activity: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
In Kiobel, the petitioners were residents of Ogoniland, Nigeria in the 
1990s, when the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria (SPDC) 
was conducting oil exploration in the area.156  Residents of Ogoniland 
protested the environmental impact of the SPDC’s activities and the SPDC 
responded by enlisting the support of the Nigerian Government.157   
                                                                                                                   
 154 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b) (2008). 
 155 Doe I, 766 F.3d at 1017 (“The plaintiffs in this case . . . were forced to work on Ivorian 
cocoa plantations for up to fourteen hours per day six days a week, given only scraps of food 
to eat, and whipped and beaten by overseers.  They were locked in small rooms at night and 
not permitted to leave the plantations, knowing that children who tried to escape would be 
beaten or tortured.  Plaintiff John Doe II witnessed guards cut open the feet of children who 
attempted to escape, and John Doe III knew that guards forced failed escapees to drink 
urine.”). 
 156 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662–63 (2013). 
 157 Id. 
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Throughout the early 1990’s, the complaint alleges, Nigerian 
military and police forces attacked Ogoni villages, beating, 
raping, killing, and arresting residents and destroying or looting 
property.  Petitioners further allege that respondents aided and 
abetted these atrocities by, among other things, providing the 
Nigerian forces with food, transportation, and compensation, as 
well as by allowing the Nigerian military to use respondents’ 
property as a staging ground for attacks.158 
As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court did not reach the merits of 
this aiding and abetting claim under the ATS.159  Instead, the Court 
unanimously agreed that the ATS did not apply extraterritorially, leaving for 
another day the question of whether the ATS may be applied to corporations 
and states.160   
As previously noted, the TVPRA is expressly extraterritorial, which 
would have provided jurisdiction over the activities occurring outside the 
United States.  Additionally, the extraterritorial jurisdiction applies if “an 
alleged offender is present in the United States, irrespective of the nationality 
of the alleged offender.”161  Royal Dutch Shell is the parent corporation of 
Shell Oil Company in the United States.162  As the third largest company in 
the world, finding personal jurisdiction over Royal Dutch Shell would be 
unlikely to present a problem.163 
Beyond jurisdictional issues, however, the more relevant question is this: 
could a person’s death be considered a “service” of that person, where a 
company benefits financially from that person’s death?  In the case of 
Kiobel, the nearby population was killed for engaging in protests.  A lack of 
protests would present a financial benefit to a company in the form of added 
stability and security.  Using the only interpretation of “labor and services” 
under the TVPRA given by a district court, the term “services” means a 
useful expenditure of physical or mental effort that does not produce a 
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 161 18 U.S.C. § 1596. 
 162 About Us: Who We Are, http://www.shell.com/abouthpus/wo-we-are.html. 
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commodity.164  Arguably, a person’s death is an ultimate and complete 
expenditure of physical or mental effort.  The killing of a person expends all 
future mental or physical ability from that person.  The benefit derived by the 
company is due to the omission of an act of protest, as opposed to the 
standard economic benefit derived from a comissive act of labor.  Thus, to 
financially benefit from the killing of others in order to obtain their labor and 
services, including the omission of disruptive acts, would be a violation of 
the TVPRA.  
The most glaring problem with this argument is in the tortured reasoning 
required to articulate it.  The fact of the matter is that Congress did not 
explicitly define forced labor to include such widespread killing in the 
interests of corporate security.  The inclusion of more severe criminal 
penalties for instances of coercion that cause death only highlights the fact 
that Congress knew how to include such a provision had they so chosen.165  
This glaring loophole in the TVPRA and also under the ATS post-Kiobel 
creates the perverse outcome that a company is less likely to face liability in 
the United States for killing a large population of people than they are for 
enslaving that same population.166   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Civil actions under the TVPRA have been the source of some criticism 
and very little success since the enactment of the 2008 amendments.  There 
is currently a significant shortage of case law regarding the civil remedy.  At 
the time of this writing, fewer than 100 cases have published rulings or 
orders since 2008, and of those, only nine have produced summary or default 
judgments in favor of the plaintiff and none have been fully litigated at 
trial.167  Civil actions under the TVPRA are expensive and time-consuming 
                                                                                                                   
 164 United States v. Marcus, 487 F. Supp. 2d 289, 300 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), vacated, 538 F.3d 
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to litigate, especially suits alleging extraterritorial violations.  Criticism of 
the TVPRA as less comprehensive than the Palermo Protocol is valid; the 
statute is far from perfect in many respects.  Perhaps the most salient 
criticism of the TVPRA is that it would not directly capture the conduct at 
issue in Kiobel, Sosa, or Mohamed, which all involved infractions that were 
ostensibly of a political, military, or otherwise non-economic nature.  
However, in light of the specific limitations found in civil suits alleging 
violations of the ATS, there is a path forward for litigation able to argue at 
least purposeful coercion through the civil remedy provision and expanded 
causes of action of the TVPRA.  Even in light of its limitations, the TVPRA 
could address a broad array of human rights violations, affecting millions of 
victims around the world that are beyond the current scope of the ATS.  
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